Ideas from 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)' by Georg W.F.Hegel [1817], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Logic (from Encyclopaedia)' by Hegel,Georg W.F. (ed/tr Wallace,W. /Finlay,J.N.) [OUP 1975,0-19-824512-2]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall'
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Existence is just a set of relationships
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Moore,AW]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking